Teaching research methods is especially challenging because we not only wish to convey formal knowledge and encourage critical thinking, as with any course, but also to enable our students dream up meaningful research projects, translate them into logical steps, conduct the research in a professional manner, analyze the data, and write up the project in APA style. We also wish to spark interest in the topics of research papers, and in the intellectual challenge of creating a research report, but we (...) have learned just how difficult these goals can be from teaching undergraduates and from serving as journal reviewers: many submissions contain flaws such as elementary errors of logic (e.g., using a null control condition instead of a placebo or dummy treatment), tangled statistics, a lack of graphs, and ungrammatical, unclear writing that violates APA rules. Yet these manuscripts are written by university faculty, often with doctorates and years of experience. Even published papers may contain egregious faults (Standing & McKelvie, 1986). And although we have both published widely, we still hone our skills. It requires optimism to expect that a typical undergraduate will do better, on the basis of just a year or two of studies in psychology. In this paper, we describe a systematic set of methodology courses and two specific practices that we think can help. Methodology Courses as the Backbone of our Psychology Program How can methodology courses promote undergraduate involvem... (shrink)

ABSTRACT:‘Race’ has long searched for a stable, suitable idea, with no consensus on a master meaning in sight. What I call deflationary pluralism about the existence of race recognizes that various meanings may be true as far as they go but avoids murky disputes over whether there are races in some sense. Once we have rejected the notion that racial essences yield innate cognitive differences, there is little point to arguing over the race idea. In its place, I propose the (...) idea of socioancestry, which jettisons racial thinking yet recognizes the social dynamics of color. For example, Black Americans, many of whom have traceable non-African ancestry, constitute an Africa-identified, socioancestrally black subgroup. ‘Race’ talk is not needed to sustain legitimate color-conscious approaches to social identity and social justice. Long-standing fixation on the race idea has obscured the simple truth that visible continental ancestry is the root of the social reality of color consciousness. (shrink)

What is the relation between the rules of war covered by ‘the war convention’ and the source of their normative authority? According to Michael Walzer, these rules have normative authority by virtue of being widely established in theory and practice and conforming to our moral sensibilities. It is striking that his influential account of just war has a conventionalist grounding similar to his more scrutinized general theory of justice. Indeed, we should question whether a shared moral understanding is an adequate (...) basis for morally obligating parties who might challenge the rules under the war convention. I argue that rules of war need the support of moral judgments whose normative authority is ultimately not conventional in nature. Reasonable objections to the war convention exert pressure to revise its standard principles or to admit that these principles lack general moral force. Such objections, inchoate though they may be in international political discourse, seem a source of commonly voiced skepticism of morality in international relations. Debate about the merits of alternative principles of just war has the advantage of engaging with this skepticism. This opens up the possibility that less powerful or more conscientious parties could play a constructive role in a public and more democratic discourse of just war. Key Words: Karl von Clausewitz • convention • Gilbert Harman • just war theory • morality • normative authority • political realism • war • the war convention • Michael Walzer. (shrink)

Margaret Gilbert presents the first full-length treatment of a central class of rights: demand-rights. To have such a right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action of another person. Gilbert argues that joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights, and gives joint commitment accounts of both agreements and promises.

Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...) discourse beyond the “matter-of-factual.” Rather, the key to his truth pluralism, his analysis of truth as “semantical assertibility,” is motivated by the same consideration that leads him to adopt truth relativism. This is his interest in applying semantic notions to discourse that embodies conceptual structures other than ours. Despite their common motivation, I conclude that Sellars’s relativism is independent of, and indeed stands in tension with, the analysis of truth that underlies his pluralism. (shrink)

The standard, non‐repeated prisoner's dilemma poses no true dilemma about rationality, we argue. What the prisoners ought rationally to do, unless they are selfless, depends on the relationship of trust that they have or lack with one another. This helps to diffuse the apparent conflict between individual and collective rationality. If the prisoners have reason to trust one another, pursuing a joint strategy would be rational for them. In the absence of trust, pursuing an individual strategy would be rational. The (...) solution that is supposed to be puzzling – because each prisoner confessing is worse for both than the alternative on which both remain silent – is simply the rational solution for persons who have no reason to trust one another. Philosophers have been misled by the apparent availability of the better alternative. Collective rationality is not relevant for persons who do not stand in a trusting relationship. When they do, there is no unresolved conflict between their individual and collective points of view.1. (shrink)

This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and yet misunderstood philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Long unavailable, _Collected Essays 1929-1968: Collected Papers Volume 2_ stands as testament to the astonishing breadth of Ryle’s philosophical concerns. This volume showcases Ryle’s deep interest in the notion of thinking and contains many of his major pieces, including his classic essays ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, ‘Philosophical Arguments’, ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions’, and ‘A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking’. He ranges over (...) an astonishing number of topics, including feelings, pleasure, sensation, forgetting and concepts and in so doing hones his own philosophical stance, steering a careful path between behaviourism and Cartesianism. Together with the _Collected Papers Volume 1 _and the new edition of _The Concept of Mind_, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle’s work. Each volume contains a substantial preface by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language. _Gilbert Ryle_ was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of _Mind_, and a president of the Aristotelian Society. _Julia Tanney_ is Senior Lectuer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne. (shrink)

I Per. 4: As the text stands now, we read that Adulis, the principal port of the Axumite Kingdom, is on a deep bay that extends due south, in front of which is an island called Oreiue, situated about 200 stades from the innermost [sc. part of the] bay towards the open seaand with both its shores paralle to the mainland, where arriving vessels now moor…Formerly they used to moor at this innermost [part of the] bay at what is called (...) Didorus Island right by this [part of the]. (shrink)

I respond to some questions raised by Frances Kamm with respect to my book Rights and Demands (2018). The book focuses on demand-rights and asks how we accrue them. In other words, how does one accrue the standing to demand an action of someone or rebuke them for non-performance? My response to Kamm emphasizes how I understand “directed duties” in this context. Contrary to the standard practice of rights theorists, I do not start from the assumption that directed duties (...) are constituted by “plain” duties in the context of other factors (about which rights theorists disagree). Rather, I understand my duty to you as the correlative and equivalent of your standing to demand the action in question. I offer a number of further clarifications and conclude by distinguishing the targets of my discussion from other phenomena of interest to moral philosophers, such as complaining and blaming. (shrink)

What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one; there are many. The standing of purported moral properties and problems about our epistemic or semantic access to them are of concern both from within and without moral practice. An account of their potential contribution to explaining our values, beliefs, conduct, practices, etc. can help in these respects. By examining some claims made about moral explanation in Judith Thompson's and Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism (...) and Moral Objectivity, I try to suggest a worthwhile account of this potential explanatory contribution. (shrink)

This volume is a direct result of a conference held at Princeton University to honor George A. Miller, an extraordinary psychologist. A distinguished panel of speakers from various disciplines -- psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelligence -- were challenged to respond to Dr. Miller's query: "What has happened to cognition? In other words, what has the past 30 years contributed to our understanding of the mind? Do we really know anything that wasn't already clear to William James?" Each participant tried (...) to stand back a little from his or her most recent work, but to address the general question from his or her particular standpoint. The chapters in the present volume derive from that occasion. (shrink)

This paper advances a fresh theorization of historicity. The word and concept of historicity has become so widespread and popular that they have ceased to have definite meaning and are used to stand for unsupported notions of the values inherent in human experience. This paper attempts to repair the concept by re-defining it as the temporal aspect of the interdependence of life; having history is to have a life intertwined with the lives of all others and with the universe. After (...) separating out the looser uses, surveying some of the literature, and defining what needs to be done, the paper examines shortcomings in the very different and widely influential conceptions of historicity of Koselleck and Heidegger. It then advances a new conception and fits it into the theoretical and moral capabilities of the philosophy of history as a core of philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

I have a long-standing relation with the noun “technoscience.” In recent years, I have been concerned with its evolution and connotations, since the period when I first thought it up. This chapter presents a survey of the various uses, transfers and significations of the term. It makes a twofold claim technoscientific research and development are conducted by a plural subject in need of a moral conscience; the study of technoscientific objects requires a methodological and operational materialism.Augmented version for this (...) volume of an essay first published in French Regards sur les technosciences, Vrin, Paris, pp. 23–38, 2006). Translation by John Stewart, University of Technology Compiègne. (shrink)

In a time of intensified interest in an "ethic of virtue," Josef Pieper stands out as one who has pondered and written about the virtues for many years. This paper explores some aspects of Pieper's thought about the virtues and focuses especially on four problems: (1) the question of the unity of the virtues; (2) the relation between natural and theological virtues; (3) the dangers for Christian ethics of picturing virtue as habitual; and (4) the question whether virtue needs any (...) reward beyond virtue itself. (shrink)

The dissertation is a study primarily in analytic metaphysics. The emphasis is on time, and the focus, on the whole, is on the notion of Now. In the first chapter I consider Now as it figures in singular demonstrative reference by giving an exposition and partially Kantian refutation of Hegel's argument that such reference is impossible. The ability to so-refer is the ability to mean and express 'this', i.e., what is here and now to me. Hegel's central mistake was to (...) confuse a demonstrative's having general applicability with standing for a generality; so he construes 'this' on the model of a predicable. He would have individuals as properties of Spirit. Thus, this sort of opening move toward absolute idealism is blocked. In ch. II I consider Now within the context of the question of the similarity of space and time. A methodology for constructing spatio-temporal (dis)analogies has recently become widely accepted and utilized, viz., formulating statement pairs with interchanged spatial and temporal terms, and then comparing their truth and logical status. I argue that space and time are quite dissimilar in the course of showing that this methodology, which has never been critically scrutinized, has serious deficiencies and limitations, and is paradox-generating. In part following suggestions from Dewey, in ch. III it is shown how we may acquire the concepts of Now and time without our being able to sense time. I rationally reconstruct these concepts by 'deriving' them from the concepts of required-for and sensed (taken tenselessly). Among other reasons, because activity is explicitly required for succeeding or failing, and because these ubiquitous conditions are sensed, our concept of time is rooted squarely in our experience of these conditions. Lastly, in ch. IV I present a new argument for the objectivity and transitoriness of Now. What's new about it is that it proceeds by considering pertinent issues (like intersubjective agreement) that arise in connection with "the specious present doctrine," which falsely casts the sensory present as a (variable) interval. (shrink)

The government itself, which is the only mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable [with the standing army] to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. Henry Thoreau, in “Civil Disobedience” It is easy to say — (...) and often is said — that we cannot have tolerable relations with new revolutionary regimes. The problem is that our anticommunist paranoia has made it impossible to find out. We do not know whether Mao's declared interest in a relationship with the Americans in the 1940s or Ho Chi Minh's were sincere. And the reason we don't know is that we never tried to find out. Those who reported it was a possibility were hounded out of the foreign service because of our suspicion and fear of communism. The legacy of that era brings to mind Ivan the Terrible's practice of murdering the bearer of bad news. We are more civilized than that; we have been content simply to ruin people's careers. J. William Fulbright, in The Price of Empire (1989) This poisonous thing I'm trying to describe is [a] characteristic way of dealing with criticism. It used to be enough to brand a critic as a radical or a leftist to make people turn away. Now we need only to call him a liberal. Soon “moderate” will be the M word, “conservative” will be the C word and only fascists will be in the mainstream. E. L. Doctorow, Brandeis Commencement, May 21, 1989 We have lived with violence for seven years It was not worth one single life But the patriot's fist is at her throat Her voice is in mortal danger... Adrienne Rich, “Natural Resources,” in Dream of a Common Language (Norton, 1978). (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the logics of essence and accident and attempt to ascertain the extent to which those logics are genuinely formalizing the concepts in which we are interested. We suggest that they are not completely successful as they stand. We diagnose some of the problems and make a suggestion for improvement. We also discuss some issues concerning definability in the formal language.

This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...) stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the better. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption without providing any justification. Although this topic raises critical issues for practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. I conclude that the profile of vanishing cogency of the scheme may be unique and is determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing conditions. (shrink)

"Trust" and Professional Power: Towards a Social Theory of Self This paper sets out to delve into the relationship trust and professional authority in the context of health care. Understood in its micro-political terms and conceived as impacting on individualorganisational levels and the socio-political; this relationship stands at the interface of competingpressures working to produce the increasing complexity of social life. “Trust” is inextricably linked withuncertainty and complexity while professional authority rests on the specialist knowledge claimed bythe range of experts (...) and technologists that inhabit the spaces through which social life is governed andcomplexity managed. (shrink)

Hegel argues in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that the notion that “God is love” (1 John 4:8) well expresses the self-developing infinitude of being. As such, love expresses the unity of difference and is, therefore, the “representation” (Vorstellung) of reason (Vernunft). This requires, however, transcending the abstract notion of the perfect God that stands over and above finite reality. At the same time love has a subjective dimension, embodied not only in mutual recognition but in the experience (...) of the highest forms of unity with otherness. This ultimately requires of the individual that he or she embrace the nothingness of his or her being and yet also engage responsibly in ethical life (Sittlichkeit). (shrink)

In his treatment of Marius in the Bellum Jugurthinum Sallust lays considerable stress on fortune2 and Marius' belief in divine assistance. I shall offer an analysis of these concepts in two sections: their use by Sallust himself in relation to Marius; their use in the earlier tradition about Marius.I. Though he is frequently mentioned in the earlier chapters of the B.J., our first formal introduction to Marius is in chapter 63. This chapter is of crucial importance. For it is the (...) response given by the haruspex to Marius when he chances to be making a sacrifice at Utica that prompts him to ask for leave to go and stand for the consulship, an office for which he has an ingens cupido. Because of the aristocratic superbia of his commander Metellus he is ‘snubbed’ by him and thenceforth ‘cupidine atque ira grassari; neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere quod modo ambitiosum foret'. (shrink)

The ArgumentWhile postmodernism has had very little influence in biology, it can provide a framework for discussing the context in which biology is done. Here, four biological views of the body/self are contrasted: the neural, immunological, genetic, and Phenotypic bodies. Each physical view of the body extrapolates into a different model of the body politic, and each posits a different relationship between bodies of knowledge. The neural view of the body models a body politic wherein society is defined by its (...) culture and laws. The genetic view privileges views of polities based on ethnicity and race. The immune body extrapolates into polities that can defend themselves against other such polities. The phenotypic view of the body politic stands in opposition to these three major perspectives and integrates them without given any predominance. The view of science as a “neural” body of knowledge contends that science is aperspectival and objective. The perspective of the “immune” body is that science exists to defend the interests of its creators. The genetic view of science is that science is the basis of all culture. The extrapolation of the phenotypic body to science insists upon the utilitarian rationale for scientific enterprises. In all instances, the genetic view of the body/body politic/body of science is presently in ascendance. (shrink)

The list of saints dragonslayers is long in Western tradition: from archangel Michael, Saint George, Saint Marcel up to captain Nemo from the famous Jules Verne’s novel. It is quite different in East Asia and especially in China, where the dragon benefits from an extremely positive valuation. What are the causes of such a symbolic reversal? This is what we are trying to elucidate in this paper. The dragon, so laden with malignity in the West and requiring a hero to (...) fight it and to restore, against multiple perversity, the solidity of the concept of being, is an auspicious image in the Chinese world that benefits from the riches of multiplicity: assimilated to the “Son of Heaven”, emperor of all under heaven, located in the center of the changing world, he ensures the correct order of political, geographic, calendar, or anthropological pluralities. Two world views stand face to face: one that saves being by slaying the dragon, the other which recognizes the value of changes and transformations. (shrink)

The essays collected together in this volume originated with a symposium which addressed a variety of issues associated with the publications of Professor W.H. Dray in the philosophy of history. In this expanded version of the original symposium, to which Professor Dray has provided a critical response, a group of prominent philosophers and historians address the central questions posed by contemporary philosophy of history - such as, the logic and methodology of historical explanation, the selection and uses of evidence, the (...) fact/value relationship, the nature of historical causation, the question of conflicting interpretations and their possible resolution, the idea of history as a school of practical wisdom, and the question whether history has any discernable pattern or meaning. These issues are approached from the experience of both historians and philosophers and represent an important increment to the long-standing and continuing debates concerning the nature and aims of the practice and philosophy of history. (shrink)

Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I (...) critically examine Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions. (shrink)

Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls an id quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the subsistentiae and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and quality. The subsistent owes its status to a collection of inferior members of the Aristotelian class of accidents, which to Gilbert 's mind are rather 'accessories' or 'attachments from without'. The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and substantial form, i.e., that by which something is subsistent. The (...) collection of subsistentiae or the forma totius is called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for either just one subsistentia or all the forms found in a subsistens even including its 'accidental' forms. The inclusion of all kinds of accidents is seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'. One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert 's ontology is esse aliquid. 'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive sense of 'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and well-delineated', not indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a something' implies concreteness, corporealness and singularity. (shrink)

How do Christian beliefs about human nature and destiny set possibilities for and limits to our political aspirations and goals? Specifically, what is the proper relation between a theology of creation and soteriology in Christian political ethics? This article considers these questions through an interpretation of the development of Gilbert Meilaender’s political thought. It concludes with some questions about that development as it stands, as well as from the standpoint of salient themes in Roman Catholic social teaching.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Should We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging by Gilbert MeilaenderCharles L. Kammer IIIShould We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging Gilbert Meilaender grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2013. 135 pp. $18.00.Should We Live Forever? The Ethical Ambiguities of Aging provides a helpful focus on both aging and research being done to extend human life expectancy. As Gilbert Meilaender notes, human beings have always (...) longed for an extended as well as a more generative life span. He raises the question, however, of whether these two desires stand in opposition. Built into our very biology is the “survival instinct,” along with the imaginative ability to transcend our biological limits. Together they generate a religious legacy of imagining life after death. But Meilaender believes we have moved into a different time. Citing John Gray, he asserts that “the hope of life after death has been replaced by the faith that death can be defeated” (xi).Meilaender presents scientific research on antiaging while observing that there is little cultural reflection on its impacts or desirability. This book steps in to provide a reflection on these larger questions from the perspective of the virtues, or what constitutes a truly “good and human” life. As the author notes, our reflections on aging and immortality are tied to our assumptions of what it means to be human. This is evident, for example, among members of the transhumanist movement, which envisions a human brain freed from dependence on a biological body. He surmises that our scientific quest for immortality may have its roots in the human quest to overcome contingency and its associated anxiety; it is in many ways the embodiment of our wish to be “gods” who have total control over our destinies.Meilaender uses classic and modern Western philosophers and theologians (including Aristotle, Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth) as well as the work of life-stage theorists (Erik Erikson and Bernard Williams) who contribute to the discussion of what constitutes a “fully human life.” Would biological immortality make a life more fully human, or is it rooted in a crass form of narcissism that makes our own survival more important than the needs and perhaps even the possibility of future generations?The book closes with a brief conversation between three friends who represent different perspectives, a useful discussion tool for raising the deeper issues presented in the book. According to the first view, we are biological organisms with prescribed natural limits; fulfillment therefore comes through accepting and finding provisional fulfillment in each of our life stages. The [End Page 216] second perspective sees human freedom and reason as the fundamental characteristics of being human and so advocates expanding life expectancy and following wherever human creativity leads. The third observes that we are constrained by our biology and yet are also free, both bound and transcendent. This perspective, however, notes that what we truly desire is not an indefinite extension of life but something richer and fuller that transcends any possibility that humans can create. Our longing is not actually a desire for more but a desire for something other than what continued existence can provide.Meilaender’s engagement of the deeper questions presented by the scientific attempt to “cure” aging and extend life indefinitely is, finally, a powerful Christian apologetic that is nevertheless respectful of other positions. If the book has a limitation, it lies in the failure to engage non-Western traditions that perceive and address the issues from much different frameworks. It also does not address the possibility that perhaps being human is to live with the awareness and resignation that, while we have a deep desire for something qualitatively fuller and richer, this is a longing that can never be fulfilled.Charles L. Kammer IIIThe College of WoosterCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Natural law is a crucial subject in the twelfth-century debates among Roman and canon lawyers, but also among the exegetes and theologians. Starting from two verses of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, the masters debated the natural capability of human being to achieve a moral knowledge and the features of the universal moral principle, that is the lex naturalis, which natural reason can understand. Through the analysis of Gilbert of La Porrée’s Glossa in epistolas Beati Pauli and of Ps. (...) Hugh of St. Victor’s Quaestiones in epistolas Beati Pauli, this essay examines the exegetical developments in the Parisian milieu of the mid-twelfth century. It shows how the doctrinal positions of Gilbert and the Ps. Hugh stand in their intellectual landscape and which influence they have in the development of the theological debate on natural law. (shrink)

Margaret Gilbert’s ‘Three Dogmas about Promising’ is a paradigm-shifting contribution to the literature, not only for its account of promissory obligation based on joint commitment, but for its equally important focus on two properties of such obligation, which her account uniquely and elegantly captures: first, that the duty to keep a promise is necessary—the obligation stands regardless of the content or morality of the promise—and, second, that it is directed, with the promisee having unique standing to demand performance. (...) A related point, implied by Gilbert’s argument, is that moral requirements, alone, can never have those properties. Here I challenge that point, arguing that moral requirements, under the right circumstances, can give rise to necessary and directed obligations, after all, and I propose one such moral obligation of which the duty to keep a promise may well be an instance. Nevertheless, I conclude, it may not provide as plausible a basis of promissory obligation as joint commitment. (shrink)

Marie-Agnès Cathiard stands out for her important contributions to research on the imaginaire. Her commitment to interdisciplinarity has opened the door to rare partnerships with the scientific community. Projects such as “Mondes numériques et spectacle vivant (Digital Worlds and Performing Arts)” have led Marie-Agnès to work at the crossroads of scientific research and artistic creation, exploring the multi-sensory aspects of the work of the electro-video artist Lionel Palun and the director Isis Fahmy. His collaboration with Patrick Pajon, illustrated by (...) a project such as “Tech’sens”, brought together seemingly distant fields of research, with the aim of constructing a typology of new models of perception linked to digital tools. Their work addressed the upheavals underway in the fields of creation and imagination, calling for a reassessment of our relationship with the changing world and technology. (shrink)

Meilaender suggests that the development bioethics as a discipline in its own right has not been entirely benign. He argues that an increasing focus on public policy has obscured the importance of background beliefs about human nature and destiny, and that without drawing attention to those beliefs one cannot fully see what is at stake in many bioethical debates. Rather than seeking a minimalist consensus, Meilaender explores ethical problems surrounding the end and beginning of life in order to uncover the (...) "soul"--That is, some of the deeper issues within bioethics that need our attention. Abortion, the issue that so often lurks just beneath the surface of bioethical argument, is discussed in the final chapter. Throughout the book Meilaender emphasizes the "soul" of all these issues - questions about who we are and what we may become, and suggests that recapturing that soul will lead us to a new appreciation of the living body as the locus of personal presence. (shrink)

In this important new collection, Gilbert Harman presents a selection of fifteen interconnected essays on fundamental issues at the center of analytic philosophy. The book opens with a group of four essays discussing basic principles of reasoning and rationality. The next three essays argue against the once popular idea that certain claims are true and knowable by virtue of meaning. In the third group of essays Harman presents his own view of meaning and the possibility of thinking in language (...) The final three essays investigate the nature of mind, developing further the themes already set out. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind offers an integrated presentation of this rich and influential body of work. which Harman has developed over thirty years. (shrink)

Evolutionary analysis focuses on how genes build organisms with different strategies for engaging and solving life’s challenges of survival and reproduction. One of those challenges is competing with conspecifics for limited resources including reproductive opportunities. This article suggests that there is now good evidence for considering two dimensions of social competition. The first, has been labeled as antisocial strategies, to the extent that they tend to be self-focused, threat sensitive and aggressive, and use tactics of bulling, threatening, and intimidating subordinates, (...) or even injuring/killing competitors. Such strategies can inhibit care and affiliative social interactions and motivation. The social signals emitted stimulate threat processing in recipients and can create stressed and highly stratified groups with a range of detrimental psychological and physiological effects. Second, in contrast, prosocial strategies seek to create relaxed and secure social interactions that enable sharing, cooperative, mutually supportive and beneficial relationships. The friendly and low/no threat social signals emitted in friendly cooperative and affiliative relationships stimulate physiological systems (e.g., oxytocin, the vagus nerve of the parasympathetic system) that downregulates threat processing, enhances the immune system, and facilitates frontal cortical processes and general wellbeing. This article reviews the literature pertaining to the evidence for these two dimensions of social engagement. (shrink)

Crowdsourcing has attracted increasing attention as a means to enlist online participants in organisational activities. In this paper, we examine crowdsourcing from the perspective of its ethical use in the support of open innovation taking a broader system view of its use. Crowdsourcing has the potential to improve access to knowledge, skills, and creativity in a cost-effective manner but raises a number of ethical dilemmas. The paper discusses the ethical issues related to knowledge exchange, economics, and relational aspects of crowdsourcing. (...) A guiding framework drawn from the ethics literature is proposed to guide the ethical use of crowdsourcing. A major problem is that crowdsourcing is viewed in a piecemeal fashion and separate from other organisational processes. The trend for organisations to be more digitally collaborative is explored in relation to the need for greater awareness of crowdsourcing implications. (shrink)

We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled to (...) you. On Ayer’s view, in seeing the hen, you directly see a speckled sense-datum or appearance. Ryle wondered how many speckles there are on the sense-datum. After all, intu­ itively, the hen does not appear to you to have 47 speckles. And if this is the case, then it does not present to you an appearance with 47 speckles. Equally, however, the hen does not appear to you not to have 47 speckles. So, it does not present an appearance that lacks 47 speckles either. (shrink)

This paper inquires the systematical consequences in the Nietzschean critics of the biological determination of life. We proposed an analysis about central topics of this determination: the finalism, the life and chaos. This approach allows us to relieve a systematical conception of what Nietzsche understands by “necessity”. This conception of necessity is not metaphysic in the traditional sense, but implies a subversion of all special metaphysic. Beyond this, it entails a critical to the transcendental and normative version, own of Kantian (...) thought, about the question of life. These confrontations seek to clarify the gnoseological and ontological areas put in check, on the status of the concept of life. (shrink)

The shape of the moral life is determined for Christians at least in part by beliefs peculiar to Christians, and a perennial problem for Christian ethics is relating that peculiar understanding to more general claims about moral knowledge. Since the problem is perennial, I propose not to solve it but to think about it. I do so by considering first the sense in which Christian ethics may be a kind of "insider's" ethic-the shared language of believers. Despite the strengths of (...) such a view, it may too greatly restrict both human and divine freedom. Having considered its difficulties from both those angles, I return to the sense of Christian life as a tradition of conduct in order to illustrate the importance of such a vision in our cultural setting. (shrink)

The British journalist Christopher Hitchens has recently noted that the extraordinary excitement created by l’affaire Pound, an excitement sustained for now some forty years, is partly the result of having no fewer than three debates going on whenever the poet’s legal situation and his consequent hospitalization are discussed. As Hitchens says, those questions are: “First, was Pound guilty of treason? If not, or even if so, was he mad? Third, was he given privileged treatment for either condition?”1 I propose to (...) discuss all three issues in a way that fairly reflects the fact that I am neither a physician nor a lawyer. What I know of the state of medical expertise, both today and in the period of time from 1943 to 1958 , leads me, as a layman, to believe that there is an enormous latitude of understanding among medical professionals as to the precise meaning of “insanity.” At one extreme, for some distinguished physicians, the term means almost nothing. They see it as a legal term and as therefore irrelevant to them; some of them follow the line of reasoning developed by Thomas Szasz over his long writing career, namely that “mental illness” if not illness in any ordinary sense of the term.2 For other medical practitioners, it does mean something, but only when it is redefined into much smaller subcategories and enriched with much more precise terminology, and when the given patient and his full range of circumstances are considered.What I know of the legal understanding of insanity is that there has been and is now little firm agreement about “insanity” or “madness.” Equally competent juries and courts have been able to set down findings that are more or less plausible on their face but do not seem to comport at all with each other. I tentatively conclude that whatever “insanity” now is in the United States, and whatever it was when Pound was found unfit to stand trial in 1945, the standard is not the lucid simplicity of the M’Naghten test, namely, the ability of the accused to understand the difference between “right” and “wrong.” Human mind, self-awareness, and motivations are vastly more complicated than such a test would imply. 1. Christopher Hitchins, “American Notes,” Times Literary Supplement, 21 Oct. 1983, p. 1160.2. See Thomas Szasz, Insanity for a synthesis of his ideas as formulated in some eighteen books. William M. Chace is professor of English and Vice Provost for Academic Planning and Development at Stanford University. He is author of The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot , Lionel Trilling: Criticism and Politics , and scholarly essays on writers including Wyndham Lewis, D. H. Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence, and James Joyce. He is now working on a study of the ways in which American culture in this century has been subjected to critical analysis. (shrink)